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Central to Errol Lord’s excellent book is the notion of a possessed (objective, 
normative) reason. For Lord, rationality is a matter of correctly responding to 
possessed reasons, what rationality requires and permits is that we react in ways that 
are appropriate given our possessed reasons, and we ought – full stop – to react in 
ways that are decisively supported by our possessed reasons. Thus for Lord, 
possessed (objective, normative) reasons are very important indeed.  
 Part of the appeal and interest of this picture is its systematicity – Lord offers a 
unified and powerful story about rationality as part of a broader ‘reasons 
fundamentalist’ picture. Nonetheless, the devil resides, to a significant extent, in the 
details, and so it’s worth examining the elements of Lord’s picture on their own 
terms. In this paper, I’ll look at three such elements. In §1, I offer objections to his 
accounts of rational requirements. In §2, I offer objections to a central argument for 
his view of what we ought to do. If successful, these objections suggest that possessed 
reasons are not as important as Lord thinks. In §3, I consider his account of possessed 
reasons itself.  
 
1. Coherence  
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Lord proposes the following accounts of what rationality permits and requires (11): 
 
Rational Permission What it is for a reaction1 R of agent A to be rationally 
permitted is for the reasons A possesses for R to be 
sufficient. 
 
Rational Requirement   What it is for a reaction R of agent A to be rationally 
required is for the reasons A possesses for R to be 
decisive.  
 
A central challenge to these accounts is to accommodate the apparent platitude that it 
is irrational to be incoherent – for example, to have inconsistent beliefs or intentions.2  
 Different forms of incoherence raise this challenge in different ways. I will 
focus on one of the most problematic cases. At least often, it is irrational to have 
inconsistent intentions – to intend to A, intend to B, and believe that you cannot both 
A and B.3 But it seems possible, indeed common, for your possessed reasons to 
sufficiently support these reactions. To take a standard example (cf. 36), you might 
possess sufficient reasons to intend to go to law school next year and sufficient 
reasons to intend to go to graduate school in philosophy next year (and decisive 
reasons to believe you can’t do both – I’ll take this as read). Nonetheless, it would be 
 
1 ‘Reaction’ is Lord’s cover term for the types of things which can be subject to reasons – e.g. actions, 
beliefs, intentions. 
2 I do not think it is the only challenge – see Way (2018: §4.2, §4.3) for two others. See Kiesewetter 
(2017: §9.4) for relevant discussion. 
3 These are ‘broadly’ inconsistent intentions. You have ‘narrowly’ inconsistent intentions if you intend 
to A and intend not to A. The discussion to follow would apply in much the same way in either case. 
Cf. 29ff. 
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irrational to both intend to go to law school and intend to go to graduate school. 
Lord’s account of what rationality permits and requires doesn’t seem to generate this 
result. 
 Lord’s solution to this problem is to propose: 
 
Intentions Attenuate When you have decisive reasons to believe that you 
can’t both j and y, intending to j attenuates the weight 
of your reasons to intention to y. In cases where you 
would otherwise possess sufficient reasons to intend to 
j and to intend to y, this attenuation makes your 
reasons to intend to y insufficient (cf. 31).  
 
So before forming an intention between law school and graduate school, you might 
have had sufficient reasons for each intention. But once you form an intention, things 
change. Once you intend, say, to go to law school, this attenuates your reasons to 
intend to go to graduate school. They will no longer be sufficient – rather, Lord 
suggests, your reasons against intending to go to graduate school will be decisive. 
Thus, you are rationally required not to intend to go to graduate school.4 
 Importantly, it doesn’t follow that your reasons to intend to go to law school 
are now decisive. This is important because, as Lord emphasises, it seems rationally 
permissible to change your mind (at least prior to taking any significant steps towards 
going to law school). So your reasons against intending to go to law school must be 
 
4 Of course, the case in which you first intend to go to law school and then form the intention to go to 
graduate school is only one way in which you might come to have inconsistent intentions – you might 
also form both intentions simultaneously. Lord suggests that in this case, each intention attenuates the 
other, so that both become rationally impermissible (31-2). I will put this version of the case aside. 
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weighty enough to make it rationally permissible not to intend to go to law school. To 
explain this, Lord suggests that your reasons to intend to go to graduate school are 
also reasons against intending to go to law school. These reasons are not attenuated. 
Thus you possess sufficient reasons to intend to go to law school but also sufficient 
reasons not to intend to go to law school. And so it is rationally permissible both to 
maintain your intention to go to graduate school and also to drop it. 
 This story is ingenious, but I have my doubts. An initial worry is that the cases 
in which Intentions Attenuate applies look very different from other, more familiar, 
examples in which reasons to intend are attenuated. I think there are three main types 
of case. 
 First, there are cases in which it is natural to say that reasons to intend are 
attenuated because reasons to act are attenuated. To take some standard examples, the 
fact that the exhibition is on for several more months attenuates your reasons to see it 
today – and so your reasons to intend to see it today (cf. 31); the fact that someone is 
culpable for getting themselves into trouble might attenuate your reasons to help them 
– and so your reasons to intend to help them (Dancy 2004: 42).  
 Our cases are not like this. It’s not particularly plausible that intending to go to 
law school makes the case for going to graduate school less strong. And in any case, I 
don’t think Lord can say that the attenuation works in this way. That’s because if 
intending to go to law school made your reasons to go to graduate school insufficient, 
then your reasons to go to law school would be decisive. And if your reasons to go to 
law school were decisive, then it would be a mistake to change your mind and drop 
your intention to go to law school. So Lord’s view must be that intending an option 
attenuates the reasons for intending an alternative without attenuating the reasons for 
taking that alternative.  
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 Second, there are cases in which intending an option is not needed for taking 
that option. For example, you probably won’t insult your students in class today, even 
if you don’t intend not to insult your students in class today. It’s plausible that this 
attenuates your reasons to intend not to insult your students, though not your reasons 
not to insult your students. But our cases are clearly not like this. Intending to go to 
law school doesn’t make it that you will go to graduate school regardless of whether 
you intend to do so! 
Third, there are cases in which intending an option will be ineffective. 
Suppose, for example, that you would be unlikely to stick with an intention to run a 
marathon – you would find the training too much of a hassle. We might think that this 
attenuates your reasons to intend to run the marathon (cf. Kolodny 2008: 369-71). 
Our cases are in some ways like this. If you intend to go to law school, 
intending to graduate school does become less likely to be effective, given the conflict 
of intentions. However, if the ineffectiveness of intending to run a marathon 
attenuates your reasons to intend to run a marathon, it also surely attenuates your 
reasons to run the marathon. Otherwise, you might have decisive reasons to run the 
marathon but insufficient reasons to intend to run. That is not a plausible verdict. 
Again though, it’s important for Lord’s view that intending an option only attenuates 
the reasons to intend alternative options. 
 So Intentions Attenuate doesn’t look like any of the more familiar examples of 
attenuators for reasons to intend. That is not in itself damning. Lord might have 
discovered a new category. To assess this, we need to consider his case for Intentions 
Attenuate.   
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 Lord’s main argument is abductive: Intentions Attenuate explains ‘a 
particularly complicated data set’ (33).5 By this, Lord means that it explains how we 
can have cases, like the choice between law school and graduate school, in which (i) 
prior to forming any intention, it is rationally permissible to intend to j and rationally 
permissible to intend to y, (ii) once you form an intention to j or an intention to y, 
forming the other intention is rationally impermissible, but (iii) it remains rationally 
permissible to drop the intention you formed. 
 However, it is not clear that Lord’s view does capture all the data. In 
particular, it is not clear that Lord can maintain (iii).6 As noted, Lord holds that once 
you intend, say, to go to law school, it remains rationally permissible to drop this 
intention because you still possess sufficient reasons against intending to go to law 
school. That is why your reasons to intend to go to law school are only sufficient, and 
not decisive, even though you lack sufficient reason to intend to go to graduate 
school.  
What are these sufficient reasons against intending to go to law school? 
According to Lord (32-3), they are provided by the same facts that are reasons to 
intend to go to graduate school – for example, as these might be, your love of 
 
5 Lord also suggests that Intentions Attenuate is supported by the view that attenuators are reasons to 
place less weight on the reasons they attenuate (33). With Intention Attenuate, this view predicts that 
the fact that you intend to go to law school is a reason to place less weight, in deliberating, on the 
reasons to intend to go to graduate school. Lord finds this prediction intuitive. I find it hard to evaluate, 
because the cases Lord needs to appeal to are hard to keep in view. Ordinarily, you would deliberate 
about whether to intend to go to graduate school by deliberating about whether to go to graduate school 
(cf. Shah 2008). But as we’ve seen, Lord does not and should not claim that your intention to go to law 
school attenuates your reasons to go to graduate school. Furthermore, we ordinarily only deliberate in 
cases where we don’t already take ourselves to have settled what to do. But if you intend to go to law 
school, then you will ordinarily take yourself to have settled what to do – you’ll be going to law school. 
6 There may also be further data that Lord’s account does not immediately explain. Here are two 
potential examples. First, before you form an intention about whether to go to law school or to graduate 
school, it is rationally impermissible to form both intentions. Second, once you intend to go to graduate 
school, it is rationally permissible to simultaneously drop this intention and form the intention to go to 
law school. Lord’s view doesn’t seem to immediately accommodate either of these claims. However, 
since these cases raise difficult issues about rationality and temporality, I leave them aside. 
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philosophy, the independence promised by an academic career, and your aptitude for 
teaching.  
 While we can grant that these are reasons against intending to go to law 
school, it is clear that they are primarily reasons to intend to go to graduate school. 
They are only reasons against intending to go to law school because they are reasons 
to intend to go to graduate school, and going to graduate school is incompatible with 
going to law school. Thus these facts are only derivative reasons against intending to 
go to law school. 
 However, it is very plausible that derivative reasons are attenuated when the 
reasons from which they derive – their source reasons – are attenuated. The intuitive 
thought here is that insofar as the case for a reaction entirely derives from the case for 
another, weakening the case for the latter will weaken the case for former too. This 
thought is borne out by examples. You might have reasons to save now just because 
you have reasons to spend later. But if your reasons to spend later are attenuated, your 
reasons to save now are attenuated too. Or, you might have reasons to believe the 
conclusion just because you have reasons to believe the premises. Again, if your 
reasons to believe the premises are attenuated, your reasons to believe the conclusion 
are attenuated too.  
 This makes trouble for Lord. It implies that if your reasons to intend to go to 
graduate school are attenuated, and your reasons against intending to go to law school 
entirely derive from your reasons to intend to go to graduate school, then your reasons 
against intending to go to law school are attenuated too. And in that case, Lord cannot 
maintain that you are rationally permitted to drop the intention to go to law school 
because you possess sufficient reason against this intention. Intentions Attenuate thus 
fails to capture the data that Lord is interested in. 
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 If this is right, Lord’s main case for Intentions Attenuate fails. Indeed, 
Intentions Attenuate generates mistaken predictions, and so should be rejected. 
 I conclude that we should be sceptical about Intentions Attenuate and thus be  
sceptical that Lord’s account can explain the irrationality of intention inconsistency. 
This is a serious problem for his accounts of what rationality requires and permits.  
 
2. Ought 
 
I now turn to Lord’s account of what we ought, full stop, to do – or, as Lord 
sometimes says, our ‘full stop obligations’.  
Lord holds that our full stop obligations are determined by the reasons we possess. 
Lord’s view is thus a version of  perspectivism. That is, he holds that what you ought 
to do depends on only some of the reasons there are – those that you possess, and so 
fall within your epistemic sphere, or ‘perspective’. Perspectivism contrasts with 
objectivism, the view that what you ought to do is determined by all the reasons there 
are, independently of your perspective.7 An important part of Lord’s case for 
perspectivism, and against objectivism, comes from the following argument (232): 
 
(1) If the reasons in some set S make it the case that you ought to j, then you can 
j because of the members of S. 
(2) If you can j because of the members of S, then you possess the members of S. 
(C) If the reasons in some set S make it the case that you ought to j, then you 
possess the members of S. 
 
7 This gloss on the distinction between objectivism and perspectivism assumes that obligations should 
be understood in terms of reasons. For a more general gloss, and further references, see Way and 
Whiting (2017). 
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(2) states a prima facie plausible condition on being guided by reasons. If a fact is a 
reason for you to j, but you do not possess that reason – for instance, because you are 
not in a position to know the fact – then plausibly you are not able to j in light of that 
fact. I shall grant this.8 
 What about (1)? This states a version of the appealing idea that our obligations 
must be action-guiding. Lord understands this idea in a specific way: 
 
If you deny (1), then you are committed to thinking that… there are cases 
where the members of S make it the case that you ought to j and it’s 
impossible for you to j and be creditworthy for j-ing. I think this is deeply 
implausible. 
 It’s implausible because it robs our full stop obligations of a certain 
kind of action guidingness. If we cannot perform the actions we are obligated 
to perform in a way that deserves credit, then those obligations are not action 
guiding. (234) 
 
Lord’s case for (1) thus rests on  
 
(Credit) If the reasons in some set S make it the case that you ought to j, then 
you can j in a way that is creditworthy.  
 
In earlier work, Daniel Whiting and I presented a counter-example to Credit: 
 
8 Of course, ‘can’ may express a range of senses. In Way and Whiting (2017), we observe that ‘can’ in 
(2) should be taken to express specific ability – roughly, both a general ability and the opportunity to 
exercise that ability. (1) must therefore be taken in the same sense. I’ll take this as read. 
 10 
 
DOCTOR A doctor is deciding whether to give drug A or drug B to a patient 
who has a painful and fatal disease. She knows that A will completely cure the 
patient, relieving all the patient’s suffering and saving her life, and that B will 
not save the life of her patient but will relieve the patient’s suffering. The 
doctor also knows that, if she tries to give one drug, she will be unable to give 
the other. However, though she is no position to know this, and despite 
evidence to the contrary, the doctor is unable… to give A. As it happens, the 
doctor gives B to the patient for the reason that it will relieve her suffering 
(Way and Whiting 2017: 367). 
 
We claimed that the doctor ought to give drug B but cannot give drug B in a 
creditworthy way.  
 Lord agrees that the doctor ought to give drug B. He denies that she cannot 
give drug B in a creditworthy way. In fact, Lord thinks the doctor does give drug B in 
a creditworthy way. However, he grants that the doctor only deserves partial credit: 
‘while the act she performs expresses some good will in virtue of the fact that it 
shows concern for the patient’s suffering, she also expresses a lack of good will in 
virtue of showing indifference towards the patient’s life’ (237). 
 I want to make two points about this response. First, as Lord acknowledges, it 
shows that Credit must be understood in a particular way. In particular, Lord must 
hold Partial Credit, not Full Credit: 
 
(Full Credit) If the reasons in some set S make it the case that you ought to j, then 
you can j for those reasons in a way that is fully creditworthy. 
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(Partial Credit) If the reasons in some set S make it the case that you ought to j, then 
you can j for those reasons in a way that is partially creditworthy (cf. 
238).  
 
This is problematic because, so it seems to me, Lord’s arguments for Credit concern 
Full Credit, not Partial Credit. Lord supports Credit by appeal to putative cases in 
which you ought to j but, because you do not possess the reasons that determine this 
obligation, are not able to j in a creditworthy way. Consider Judith Thomson’s case 
in which, due to an unforeseeable series of coincidences, flipping the light switch 
when you get home will electrocute your neighbour. As an objectivist, Thomson 
thought that you ought not flip the light switch. Lord objects: 
 
there is simply no way you can do what you ought for the right reason… [T]he 
only way you can do what you ought to do is by doing something idiotic. 
There’s no way for the right-makers of your act to get any legitimate grip on 
you. But, we’re supposed to believe, they require you to stumble around in the 
dark all the same. This is dubious (234). 
 
However, similar concerns can be raised about the possibility of cases in which you 
ought to j but can only j in a way that deserves partial credit. When the doctor gives 
drug B, they are doing something grossly indifferent. And if it is dubious that we can 
be obliged to be idiotic, it is surely also dubious that we can be obliged to be grossly 
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indifferent. Indeed, it is easy to change the example so that giving drug B is idiotic – 
for instance, we can add that the Doctor’s primary aim is to save the patient’s life.9  
 Thus Lord’s arguments for Credit do not support Partial Credit. If Lord agrees 
that Doctor undermines Full Credit, and thus wants to defend his perspectivism by 
appeal to Partial Credit, he needs to provide new arguments for Partial Credit.  
 The second point about Lord’s response to Doctor is that it does not speak to 
some more general problems that the case raises for his views. As we’ve seen, Lord 
holds that what we ought to do and what we are rationally required to do are both 
determined by the reasons we possess. This means that Doctor bears on Lord’s 
account of rational requirements, as well as his account of obligation. In fact, Doctor 
raises three problems for this account. 
 First, it is not plausible that the doctor is rationally required to give drug B. 
Again, this is perhaps clearest if we add that the doctor aims to save the patient’s life. 
In that case, it is plainly irrational to give drug B. Given the doctor’s evidence, it is 
clear that this will not achieve her (rational) aim. 
 Second, and relatedly, the case undermines a principle that plays an important 
role in Lord’s arguments: ‘whenever you are ex ante rational in j-ing, you can be ex 
post rational in j-ing’ (101). Applied to Doctor, this implies that the doctor must be 
able to rationally give drug B. But the doctor is not able to rationally give drug B. 
Although she can give drug B for the reason that makes it rational to give drug B, she 
is not able to give drug B in a way that is sensitive to the weight of this reason. Given 
 
9 What about Lord’s claim that in Thomson’s case the right-makers cannot get a ‘legitimate grip’ on 
you? I suggest that this is true in Doctor too. Although the doctor is aware of the facts which are right-
makers, she is not in a position to be sensitive to them as right-makers. Cf. 141. 
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her evidence and aims, she is not able to give drug B in a way that would be 
sensible.10 
 Third, it is clear that it is rational for the doctor to believe that she ought to 
give drug A. She knows that drug A will completely cure the patient and relieve all 
her suffering, while drug B will only relieve the patient’s suffering. And she has 
misleading but – we can stipulate – sufficient evidence that she can give drug A. If the 
doctor is nonetheless rationally required to give drug B, this is a case in which it is 
rational for the doctor to be akratic. But akrasia is a paradigmatic form of irrational 
incoherence. (Indeed, Lord is keen to show that his view can explain why akrasia is 
irrational (45ff)). 
 I conclude that Lord’s response to Doctor is unsuccessful. As things stand 
then, we should reject Credit.11 Since one of Lord’s central arguments for 
perspectivism – and for his view that obligations are determined by possessed reasons 
– rests on Credit, this argument thus fails. We have also seen that Doctor raises 
problems for Lord’s account of what rationality requires. 
 
3. Possession 
 
I now turn to Lord’s account of possessed reasons: 
 
 
10 Lord could say that doctor is able to give drug B in a ex post partially rational way. This would raise 
issues parallel to those raised by the appeal to Partial Credit. 
11 Of course, other ways of defending Credit against Doctor are possible. In particular, it might be 
denied that the doctor ought to give drug B. For discussion, see Way and Whiting 2017: §7.2-7.3. 
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(Possession) What it is for an agent A to possess r as a reason to j provided by fact 
f is for A to be in a position to manifest knowledge about how to use r 
to j (124). 
 
This is one of the book’s most distinctive and interesting features. Many have 
assumed that possession is a purely epistemic (or doxastic) condition – that 
possessing reasons is simply a matter of, e.g. believing, or rationally believing, or 
knowing, the facts which provide reasons. Lord makes a powerful case that such 
conditions are insufficient. If Lois knows that the fish on her plate contains 
salmonella, but believes that salmonella is an entirely harmless bacteria, she may not 
possess the fact that her fish contains salmonella as a reason not to eat. Given her 
background belief, this fact does not bear negatively on the rational merits of eating 
the fish. But bearing on the rationality of our reactions is just what possessed reasons 
are supposed to do (97-99). 
 The central notion in Possession is that of knowing how to use a reason r to j. 
It does not seem to me that this is an ordinary notion, one that gets much expression 
in ordinary talk and thought. So we need some guidance on how it is to be 
understood.  
  What is it to ‘use a reason’? A natural answer is that you use a reason r to j 
just when r is your reason for j-ing. However, knowing how to use a reason r to j is 
not simply a matter of being able to j in light of r. Knowing how to use a reason is ‘a 
competence. It disposes one to get things right’ (117).  
 This suggests that knowing how to use a reason is knowing how to use that 
reason in the right way. This raises an initial worry. It is not clear that there need be 
any such thing as the right way to use a reason. After all, reasons can be outweighed. 
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And when they are, it doesn’t seem like there is any right way to use them. Consider 
the good version of Lois’ case, in which she does appropriately respond to the fact 
that her fish contains salmonella by refraining from eating the fish. Here it might 
nonetheless be true that the fish will be tasty, which is a reason to eat it. What is the 
right way for her to use this reason? It’s not by eating the fish for that reason – that 
would be a terrible idea. Perhaps she should give some weight to this fact, or to some 
extent desire or be motivated to eat the fish by this fact? This seems dubious too. It 
might be fine for her not to give any thought to the fact that the fish is tasty.12   
 It thus remains unclear how we are to understand the notion of knowing how 
to use a reason. However, this may not matter for Lord’s purposes. This is because 
Lord also elucidates the notion of knowing how to use a reason by appeal to certain 
dispositions (135ff). He thus has the option of directly analysing possession in terms 
of these dispositions, rather than going via know-how.13 For example, he could 
propose: 
 
(PossessionD) What it is for an agent A to possess r as a reason to j is, in part, for A 
to be disposed to j when r is a reason to j and be disposed to revise j-
ing when r ceases to be a reason to j.14 
 
 
12 Nor should we say that the right way for her to use this fact is to not to give it any thought. Doing so 
would make possession too easy to come by. For example, it would imply that Lois possesses the 
reason provided by the fish containing salmonella in the original, bad version of the case, where it also 
seems appropriate for her not to give this any thought. 
13 This sometimes seems to be what Lord intends (e.g. p.111, n.26). But elsewhere he seems to take the 
dispositions to be posterior to the know-how (e.g. 139). 
14 This draws on the dispositions Lord describes in his account of what it is to j for a normative reason 
(138-9). Note that PossessionD could only state part of a a real definition of possession, since 
possessing a reason requires you to stand in some epistemic relation to it. Lord takes this to be implied 
by Possession, but it is not implied by PossessionD. 
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However, this account is also open to objection. Consider again a version of Lois’ 
case in which Lois possesses the fact that the fish contains salmonella as a reason to 
refrain from eating the fish. Of course, Lois might also know that the fish will be 
tasty, which is a reason to eat it. According to PossessionD, Lois possesses this reason 
only if she is disposed to eat the fish when the fact that the fish will be tasty is a 
reason to eat it. But this disposition doesn’t look like a good disposition to have. After 
all, it might lead her to eat the fish even though she knows it contains salmonella. It is 
surprising that possessing this reason requires her to have this liability of a 
disposition. 
 This worry might seem overstated. After all, if Lois possess the fact that the 
fish contains salmonella as a reason to refrain from eating the fish, she’ll also be 
disposed to refrain from eating the fish. Her dispositions will clash and so at least one 
won’t be manifested.  
 However, this clash of dispositions can only be expected to prevent her from 
eating the fish if her dispositions are sensitive to the weights of the respective reasons. 
What she needs are dispositions to refrain from eating the fish when the fact that it 
contains salmonella is a decisive reason to refrain, or to eat the fish only when the fact 
that it is tasty is (at least) a sufficient reason to eat the fish. These dispositions are 
indeed good dispositions to have. But they must be distinguished from the 
dispositions which, according to (PossessionD) are partly constitutive of possessing 
reasons.  
 This suggests the following revision to PossessionD: 
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(PossessionD*) What it is for an agent A to possess r as a reason to j is, in part, for A 
to be disposed to j when r is a sufficient reason to j and be disposed 
to revise j-ing when r ceases to be a sufficient reason to j. 
 
The problem with PossessionD* is that reasons are not sufficient or insufficient 
simpliciter. They are only sufficient or insufficient relative to sets of reasons. The fact 
that the fish is tasty might be a sufficient reason to eat it, relative to the set of reasons 
which contains only the fact that the fish is tasty and, say, that it costs $10. But it 
might be insufficient relative to a set of reasons which also contains the fact that the 
fish contains salmonella. Which set of reasons should we take PossessionD* to refer 
to? The only plausible answer seems to be: the set of reasons you possess. But then 
PossessionD* is circular. It defines what it is to possess a reason by reference to the 
reasons you possess.15 
 So while I am moved by Lord’s case against purely epistemic accounts of 
possession, I am not yet convinced he has found the right way to move beyond them.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
I have argued that possessed reasons may not be as important as Lord suggests. 
Lord’s view that what rationality requires and permits is that you react in ways that 
are appropriate given your possessed reasons faces a serious problem explaining the 
irrationality of inconsistent intentions. One of Lord’s central arguments for his view 
that obligations are determined by possessed reasons rests on a claim, Credit, which is 
 
15 The same worry would arise for a version of PossessionD which appealed to a disposition to be 
moved in proportion to the weights of reasons. This is because reasons plausibly only have weights 
relative to sets of reasons (cf. 141).  
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subject to counter-examples. And Lord’s account of possessed reasons itself also 
faces difficulties. For these reasons, I am yet to be fully convinced by some of the 
central claims of Lord’s book. Nonetheless, I have learnt a great deal by working 
through it.16 
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